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[Disarmo] I prossimi impegni di guerra dell'esercito europeo


The Agenda 2020


(Own report) - The EU has announced a military intervention into the
Central African Republic. Last Monday, EU foreign ministers in Brussels
decided to soon send soldiers from several EU countries to Bangui to
support French troops in that country. The Bundeswehr will most likely
participate with transport aircraft and a MedEvac Airbus. The German
Foreign Minster has also suggested the possibility of expanding the
deployment of German military in Mali. This is where the Franco-German
Brigade is due to make its first major deployment. But the power
struggle between Germany and France continues to loom in the background.
Berlin wants to use the mission in Mali to break France's exclusive
influence in the West African francophone countries. Members of the
Bundeswehr have announced that "over the next few years" Germany will
have "to deal with Africa, particularly its north and center." Even
before ending its (partial) withdrawal from Afghanistan, Germany is
already focusing on a new intervention - in line with the global
offensive Berlin's foreign policy establishment has been pushing for
with growing intensity since last autumn.
The Traditional Regulatory Power
Last Monday, EU foreign ministers decided to rapidly deploy EU troops to
the Central African Republic, because of the threat of the country's
violent clashes escalating. France has already stationed its troops in
the country and is trying to assert its traditional role as the
"regulatory power" in African francophone countries. To provide relief
for its army, which is already involved in Mali, Paris has pressured the
EU into participating in an intervention. According to yesterday's
decision, soldiers from various EU countries will soon be deployed to
Bangui - 500 soldiers are presently under consideration. Berlin will
probably contribute air transport, in-flight refueling and an Air Force
MedEvac Airbus to rescue the wounded. Should Paris provide the
intervention's headquarters - which seems likely - Brussels would help
finance part of its future mission in Bangui.
German "Schutztruppe"
Already last weekend, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
suggested the possibility of expanding the deployment of German troops
in Mali. Mali, like the Central African Republic, is one of the
francophone countries, where France is deploying the, by far, largest
contingent and is therefore seeking relief. "We have to examine ways to
increase our support, for example in Mali," Steinmeier declared.[1] The
Süddeutsche Zeitung had previously, reported that Germany is already
planning to boost the size of its troops. Soldiers of the Franco-German
Brigade are due to soon be sent to Mali. "Military circles" are planning
to station a "Schutztruppe" (a protection force)[2] in Bamako and to
"deploy another military unit in a smaller town to secure a training
project." It is also very interesting that, according to the Süddeutsche
Zeitung last week, Inspector General Volker Wieker announced in the
Bundestag's Defense Committee an "increase" in the German "commitment in
Mali."[3] In Germany, it is the parliament - rather than the Inspector
General - which officially decides on military missions.
The Most Important Partner
This new Africa offensive illustrates the current state of the power
struggle between Berlin and Paris over the predominance in EU military
policy. Since the beginning of planning for a common EU military policy,
Germany has been blocking - or reducing to a minimum - interventions in
the francophone countries, so as not to help France shore up its role as
a "regulatory power." (german-foreign-policy.com
<http://german-foreign-policy.com> reported.[4]) Berlin has supported
longer interventions only in Southeast Europe or in non-francophone
African countries (Sudan, Horn of Africa), where it pursues its own
interests. This policy has only been carefully revised since its
participation in early 2013 in the Mali intervention. This has been
accompanied by an attempt to break the predominating French influence in
the francophone West African countries and strengthen German
positions.[5] Mali can serve as the best example. Last December, the
German Chancellor held negotiations with the Malian President on
increasing German activities in that West African country. Following the
negotiations, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta explained to the press
that Germany is enjoying "the diplomatic code 001" in Mali and is "the
most important partner."[6] Up to now, France has held this position.
An Unequal Trade-Off
Now, Berlin is accordingly reinforcing Bundeswehr units in Mali. German
interests in the Central African Republic can be succinctly summed up by
pointing to the fact that Berlin does not even maintain a diplomatic
mission in that country. This is why Chancellor Merkel had categorically
ruled out sending German ground troops to that country last year. There
is a dual reason for Berlin's current partial change in policy of no
longer blocking an EU mission to the Central African Republic and of
even making several Bundeswehr aircraft available. On the one hand,
France's president gave up his final resistance to the German Euro
austerity dictate last week. He officially announced double-digit
billions in budget cuts and lucrative favors for business - modeled
along the lines of the German "Agenda 2010". For Europe, this has
economically dealt Berlin a free hand.[7] Commentaries in the media have
clearly made allusion to a trade-off between Hollande's "promises of
reforms" and Berlin's approval of the EU mission to the Central African
Republic.[8] Albeit, this trade-off has a strict time limit. The German
Foreign Minister made it clear that the intervention in the Central
African Republic is a "European stop-gap mission," which will be
terminated as soon as an African intervention force of sufficient
strength is ready for deployment.[9] Berlin has also blocked the
deployment of an EU battle group to that country. Therefore Paris has
only limited "European" means at its disposal for a limited amount of time.
German Global Policy
On the other hand, the intervention in the Central African Republic and,
above all, the reinforcement of German troops in Mali, provide an
opportunity for an ostentatious build-up of the German-European presence
is sub-Saharan Africa. In the fall of 2013, Berlin had launched a PR
offensive for a more aggressive global policy.[10] In German concepts,
EU military interventions - more than those of NATO - will play
fundamental roles in the future. At the Bundeswehr's Annual Reception in
Potsdam last week, commander of the Bundeswehr's Joint Operations
Command, Lt. Gen. Hans-Werner Fritz announced "that we will be dealing
with Africa, particularly its north and center, for the next few
years."[11] Berlin's policy toward Mali is an indication that, below the
surface of EU military interventions, massive German efforts to break
France's influence in Francophonie can be expected.
The New Europe
Over the past few days, the head editor of the foreign policy desk of
the Süddeutsche Zeitung had also reported on the expansion of German
operations in Africa. This editor is among the "elite journalists"
listed in a recent scientific study, who propagates the views of the
leading political/military circles of commanders to public opinion -
using, at times propaganda techniques.[12] "Mali and Central Africa,"
that editor explained, even in the context of German-French rivalry, are
"test cases" for "a new European balance." "The script for this new
Europe is not yet on the table," he wrote, "but the appetite to write it
is growing." The expansion and reinforcement of the common EU military
policy in Africa has the wherewithal to become "an Agenda 2020 in
foreign policy."[13]
[1] Steinmeier prüft Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Mali.
www.finanznachrichten.de <http://www.finanznachrichten.de> 18.01.2014.
[2] "Schutztruppe" war die offizielle Bezeichnung für die
Kolonialtruppen in den Kolonien des Deutschen Kaiserreichs.
[3] Christoph Hickmann, Stefan Kornelius: Bundesregierung bereitet
Afrika-Einsatz vor. www.sueddeutsche.de <http://www.sueddeutsche.de>
[4] See Desert War
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58502> and Die
Abkopplung Frankreichs
[5] See Nur ein erstes Signal
[6] See Deutschland 001
[7] See Le Modèle Gerhard Schröder
[8] Stefan Kornelius: Nach Afrika, für Europa. www.sueddeutsche.de
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de> 20.01.2014.
[9] EU beschließt Militärmission in Zentralafrika. www.spiegel.de
<http://www.spiegel.de> 20.01.2014.
[10] See Sleeping Demons
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58684>, The
Re-Evaluation of German Foreign Policy
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/58691> and Bereit zur
globalen Ordnungspolitik
[11] Daniel Brössler, Christoph Hickmann, Stefan Kornelius: Wie
Deutschland den Franzosen in Afrika hilft. www.sueddeutsche.de
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de> 18.01.2014.
[12] See Elitejournalisten
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58688> and Rezension:
Uwe Krüger: Meinungsmacht
[13] Stefan Kornelius: Nach Afrika, für Europa. www.sueddeutsche.de
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de> 20.01.2014.


This Year's Wars


(Own report) - The periodical of the German Council on Foreign Relations
(DGAP) has published a survey on this years' ten possibly most dangerous
conflicts. As author, Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, writes, her list covers ten countries / regions of
conflict, where a range of factors have led or could lead to escalation:
For example, these include "organized crime," "political competition,"
"authoritarian rule." The author does not mention western interventions
as a cause of the desolate situations in a whole series of countries,
even though she lists Libya as one example of the "top ten" conflicts.
Libya was crushed by the 2011 NATO aggression and has been unable to
recover since. Her list, published by the DGAP, does not mention South
Sudan - a product of a geostrategically motivated western secessionist
policy, which, last December, has erupted into bloody battles. Louise
Arbour anticipates the aggravation of conflicts particularly in Russia's
northern Caucasus. Severe conflicts in that region could seriously
weaken Russia.
The "Top 10" Conflicts
The periodical of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
"Internationale Politik" has published the article entitled "Next Year's
Wars" on its website.[1] The article originally appeared December 30 in
the US publication, "Foreign Policy." This article was authored by
Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2004 -
2008) and since 2009 President and CEO of the transatlantic
"International Crisis Group." In her article, Arbour focuses on ten
countries / regions where dangerous conflicts are smoldering, which, in
her opinion, could escalate at any moment.
A Range of Factors
According to the author, the list of conflict countries / regions - now
also submitted for discussion by the "Internationale Politik" -
illustrates the "remarkable range of factors that can cause
instability." According to the author, these include, "organized crime,"
"political competition around elections," "the threat of insurgency," as
well as "regional spill over" (without further elucidation).
"Center/periphery tensions" or "authoritarian rule" could also lead to
conflicts. The author acknowledges that conflicts could have "long
roots," for example, underdevelopment and inequality. But, she
disregards the deeper causes of underdevelopment and inequality, as well
as western interventions. This is all the more surprising, when she
mentions four countries / regions, which have been plunged into war or
civil war by western interference and two others, where Western
activities - including those of Germany - have led to serious internal
tensions. All "Top 10" conflict regions have experienced noxious Western
The West's Innocence
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya and the Sahel Zone are among the ten
countries or regions listed by Arbour. The war in Syria has largely been
fuelled by the fact that foreign countries began early to support armed
opponents of the government and have continued furnishing them arms,
either directly or by way of allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar or
Turkey.[2] There was no lack of warnings that this conflict could suffer
irreversible escalation and that because of the regional
social-religious relations, it could be expected that the war will
spillover, at least into Lebanon.[3] In her analysis of the Iraqi
situation, Arbour does not mention the 2003 Western invasion; instead
she exclusively attributes the current combat to - undeniable - domestic
shortcomings. The same applies to Libya: The article makes it clear that
the author obviously considers the fact of the Libyan state having been
destroyed by NATO's war on the Gadhafi government, to be completely
insignificant. It is general knowledge that the Northern Mali conflicts
were ignited by the destruction of the Libyan state making possible
alliances of ethnic cliques and Salafists, to plunder arsenals and
become active as militias in the Sahel Zone. In Arbour's analysis, this
is not even mentioned as the trigger for combat in Mali.
Not Worth Mentioning
In Arbour's interpretation of the tensions in Honduras and Sudan,
Western states appear absolutely innocent. Both countries are also among
the "Top 10" in her list of conflicts. Arbour admits that in Honduras -
one of the world's top ten countries with the greatest inequality -
poverty and a lack of rule of law are leading to tensions and violence.
"Violence in Honduras spiked upward in 2009, when President Manuel
Zelaya was ousted in a coup," she writes. Zelaya wanted to bring
Honduras into an alliance with ALBA member countries, led by Venezuela
and Bolivia, where the struggle against poverty is of great importance.
Because western foreign policy considers ALBA undependable, there were
no objections from Washington or Berlin to the putsch that withdrew
Honduras from ALBA. On the contrary, German foreign policy front
organizations pleaded in favor of complacency with the putsch, with
whose protagonists they had been closely cooperating.
(german-foreign-policy.com <http://german-foreign-policy.com>
reported.[4]) Arbour evidently did not mention, for example, the role
played by the FDP-affiliated Friedrich Naumann Foundation during the
putsch in Honduras.
Poor Governance
Also in the case of Sudan, if one were to believe the text published by
"Internationale Politik," the secession of South Sudan, so resolutely
pushed by the West, had led to no mentionable consequences. Arbour, for
example, classifies Khartoum's suspending fuel subsidies - a measure,
often enough demanded by Western finance institutions, such as the IMF -
as a case of "poor governance." This measure, however, was in fact made
necessary by the government's loss of revenue from oil exports.
Three-fourths of Sudan's oil reserves are on South Sudanese territory.
South Sudan's secession, also imposed with Berlin's help, has
dramatically reduced Khartoum's state revenues.[5] It is noteworthy that
Arbour's "Top 10" list does not include South Sudan, whose secession was
a top priority project among Berlin's policies toward Africa. The
author's attempt to pass over the escalating South Sudanese conflict in
silence, suffered a dramatic setback just prior to publication of her
article. The bloody combat, sparked in mid-December, has already
accounted for up to 10,000 casualties. (german-foreign-policy.com
<http://german-foreign-policy.com> reported.[6])
On her "Top 10" list, alongside the Central African Republic and
Bangladesh, Arbour includes also Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus.
According to the article published by DGAP, Central Asia is, at the
moment, tottering "ever closer to a political and security implosion."
The five Central Asian nations are ascribed to Russia's immediate sphere
of influence. The Northern Caucasus - including Sochi - which Arbour has
included in her list, is Russian territory. The author admits that
"there were at least 30 terrorist attacks in southern Russia" in 2013.
Whereas her "Top Ten" list of conflicts does not include the US drone
warfare - supported by intelligence information from Germany's BND -
against presumed or real terrorists in Pakistan, and does not even
consider Western drone operations worth mentioning, she accuses Russia -
which is not using drones - of "reverting to heavy-handed methods" which
will escalate the conflict in the Northern Caucasus. Arbour's hypocrisy
particularly demonstrates that the Western political establishment, the
DGAP included, concocts inconsistent tactical arguments, to apply them
against Russia. This, in fact, nurtures apprehensions that a new major
conflict - possibly in the Northern Caucasus - could erupt.
[1] Zitate hier und im Folgenden aus: Louise Arbour: Die Kriege des
kommenden Jahres. Von Sotchi bis Sudan: 10 Konflikte, die 2014 die
globale Stabilität bedrohen werden. zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org
<http://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org> 10.01.2014.
[2] See also German War Assistance
[3] See also Nach vierzig ruhigen Jahren
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58381> and Religion
und Interesse <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/58649>.
[4] See also The Naumann Caucus
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/56260> and Ein
[5] See also Nächstes Jahr ein neuer Staat
[6] See also The Impact of Geostrategists

G. Jure Ellero glry at ngi.it
-- web adviser --
www.sibialiria.org    -Geopolitica
www.diecifebbraio.info  -Resistenza
http://boinc.berkeley.edu/ -Scienza